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THE UNEVEN PLAYING FIELD,t
PART III, OR WHAT'S ON
THE DISCOVERY CHANNEL
THOMAS F. LIOTTIft
The last time the Supreme Court spoke on the issue of
discovery in criminal cases was in Kyles v. Whitley.' In Kyles,
the Court expanded the duties of prosecutors by requiring them
to act with due diligence to turn over all exculpatory or, as it is
more commonly referred to, "Brady"2 material. The Court
determined that the prosecutor's obligation to disclose is not
contingent on whether the material was under the actual control
of prosecutors. Rather, the due diligence requirement
pronounced in Kyles pivots on whether prosecutors can, by
exercising due diligence, obtain the exculpatory evidence,
thereby mandating its turnover to the defense. 3
New discovery requirements, even those from the Supreme
Court, are slow to trickle down to local prosecutors and state
authorities. 4 Prosecutors resist implementing new measures
which burden themselves. 5 Moreover, in state practice there is a
t Thomas F. Liotti and Christopher Zeh, The Uneven Playing Field: Part I,
Ethical Disparities Affect Criminal Cases, THE ATTORNEY OF NASSAU COUNTY,
March, 2000 at 5, 14, 15, and 16 and the New YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION JOURNAL, Winter, 1999, Vol. 7, No. 2 at 75; NEW YORK
STATE BAR ASSOCIATION ONE ON ONE (a publication of the General Practice Section)
Summer 2000, Vol. 2, No. 2 at 21; 17 TouRo L. REV. 2 (2001); VERDICT (a
publication of the National Coalition of Concerned Legal Professionals) April, 2002,
Vol. 8, No. 2 at 3-23; The Uneven Playing Field: Part II, Ethical Disparities Cloud
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1 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
2 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
3 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437-38.
4 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321, 323-24 (Pa. 1992) (noting
deliberate failure of the prosecution to turn over exculpatory evidence despite the
holding in Brady).
5 See Cynthia KY. Lee, From Gatekeeper to Concierge: Reigning in the Federal
Prosecutor's Expanding Power over Substantial Assistance Departures, 50 RUTGERS
L. REV. 199, 246-47 (describing prosecutors resistance to overall constraints on
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tendency to skirt these requirements or to ignore simply
important federal decisions.6  Since courts rarely admonish
prosecutors, dismiss cases, or make referrals to grievance
committees for non-disclosure, the penalty for prosecutors for
nondisclosure, aside from convicting the innocent, or at least
those who might be found not guilty, is de minimis. Thus,
prosecutors have little incentive to follow the holding of Kyles.
It appears, however, that times are changing. For example,
the Second Circuit has displayed a vigorous interest in discovery
issues and a willingness to reverse convictions based upon
discovery abuses. Most recently, in United States v. Gil,7 the
Second Circuit reversed the mail fraud conviction of a heating
and air-conditioning contractor because of the prosecution's
discovery abuses.8
Gil allegedly committed mail fraud by over-billing the Off-
Track Betting Corporation (OTB).9 Prior to trial, the defendant
made numerous demands for discovery, continually invoking
Kyles v. Whitley as the burden of the prosecution. Two days
before the start of trial, the prosecutor turned over three
thousand pages of so-called "3500 material."10 None of the
information was highlighted as Brady material. Amidst the
voluminous 3500 material was a memorandum from an OTB
employee that indicated that the manner in which the defendant
billed had been approved by OTBl1--thus Gil's defense of
entrapment by estoppel became more viable. Yet the defense did
not find the memo until five months after the trial ended.' 2 The
Second Circuit criticized the prosecutors for not making this
memo available sooner and for not disclosing it pursuant to the
numerous discovery demands that had been made. 13 Because
their broad exercise of discretion).
6 See George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and
Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 67 (2000) (highlighting constant prosecutorial
resistance and attack on Brady obligations and the violations thereof).
7 297 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2002).
8 Id. at 95-96.
9 Id. at 95.
10 See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2002) (stating procedural rules applicable to demands
for production of statements and reports of witnesses); see also Gil, 297 F.3d at 96.
11 Gil, 297 F.3d at 95-96.
12 Id. at 98.
13 See id. at 107 ("The government has not otherwise undertaken to justify its
failure to find and timely deliver the Bradford memo, and there is no obvious
explanation for this failure in light of the defendant's numerous requests for such
[Vol.77:67
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the memorandum was material to the defendant's conviction, the
Second Circuit remanded the case for a new trial. 14
Seizing upon the Second Circuit's commitment to a criminal
defendant's right to exculpatory material as evidenced in Gil,
this Article gives a brief overview of Supreme Court and Second
Circuit jurisprudence in the field of Brady material. Further,
this Article briefly examines the import of Gil with particular
reference to sanctions that are currently imposed and what
sanctions that should be imposed against prosecutors who fail to
disclose Brady material.
I. THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO EXCULPATORY MATERIAL
Brady v. Maryland established the prosecution's obligation
to turn over any exculpatory material to the defense. 15 The mere
failure to turn over evidence, however, is not sufficient to
establish a Brady violation. Rather, a Brady violation in the
Second Circuit requires that (1) "[tlhe evidence at issue must be
favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or
because it is impeaching"; (2) "the evidence must have been
suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently"; and
(3) "prejudice must have ensued."16 These requirements are
firmly rooted in Supreme Court jurisprudence.
In United States v. Bagley,17 the Court held that prejudice
ensues where there is a "reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result... would have
been different." 8 This standard, in effect, requires the trial
court to make a determination of the skill and ability of trial
counsel. 19 Brady material is a lethal weapon in the hands of an
documents.").
14 By the time of the reversal, the defendant had already served over six
months of a three year sentence, had expended considerable sums for legal fees, and
had forfeited a luxury yacht to the United States government. Moreover, the
defendant had been barred from doing business with municipalities including the
City of New York. These were a few of the consequences of non-disclosure which
prosecutors failed to recognize. Gil had made an application for bail pending appeal
that was denied.
15 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
16 Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89, 98 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Strickler v.
Greene, 527 U.S. 236, 281-82 (1999)); see also United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132,
140 (2d Cir. 2001).
17 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
18 Id. at 682.
19 See id. at 683.
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effective advocate. 20 The Supreme Court suggests that Brady
material becomes less prejudicial if defense counsel is ineffective
during trial.21 Under the Sixth Amendment, the defendant has a
constitutional right to prudent and effective counsel. Denying
the admission of Brady material based on an attorney's
ineptitude further hampers the criminal defendant's
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. No court
should be permitted to deny a Brady violation because the
defense lawyer was ineffective; the Bagley Court stated as
much.22
In construing whether there is a "reasonable probability"
that a different outcome would have occurred, the Court has
stated that if Brady material would enable the defense to attack
the "thoroughness and even the good faith of the investigation,"
then a Brady violation may have occurred. 23 For example, in Gil,
the Brady material might have assisted the defendant in an
entrapment by estoppel defense. 24 While the Court in Gil did not
pass upon the admissibility of that evidence, it concluded that
there was a "reasonable probability" that it would have affected
the outcome. 25
Aside from articulating the materiality standards for a
Brady violation, the Court has also addressed the nature of the
prosecution's obligation to turn over Brady material. Kyles
cemented the affirmative nature of the prosecution's duty to
disclose exculpatory material.26 In Kyles, the defendant was
convicted by a Louisiana jury of first-degree murder and
sentenced to death. Following the affirmance of his conviction
on direct appeal, it was revealed that the prosecutor had
withheld evidence favorable to the defendant, 27 including
eyewitness statements taken by the police, statements from an
informant who never testified, and a computer printout of license
20 See id. at 682-83.
21 See id.
22 See id.
23 Kyles v. Whitely, 514 U.S. 419, 445 (1994).
24 See United States v. Gil, 297 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Although the
government discounts the significance of the memo, and reasonable minds can differ
about that (the district judge, for one), the government runs a certain risk when it
turns over so late documents sought by the defense for so long.").
25 Id. at 105.
26 See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 454.
27 Id. at 421-22.
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numbers of cars parked at the crime scene on the night of the
murder. 28 In reversing Kyles' conviction, the Court expanded the
disclosure duties created in United States v. Agurs.29
In Agurs, the Court determined that "a defendant's failure to
request favorable evidence did not leave the Government free of
all obligation" to disclose exculpatory material.30 In Kyles, the
Court went one step further. While the Court noted that
constitutional requirements were less onerous than those of the
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice3' and the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct,32 it still imposed a substantial
responsibility on prosecutors. Pursuant to Kyles, prosecutors
have "a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the
others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including
the police."33
Following the Court's lead, the Second Circuit has made it
clear that the defendant's right to exculpatory evidence is a most
serious consideration. Specifically, in United States v. Payne,34
the Second Circuit rejected the notion that the prosecution's
state of mind has any bearing on the defendant's right to receive
exculpatory evidence. The court stated:
Under Brady and its progeny, the government has an
affirmative duty to disclose favorable evidence known to it,
even if no specific disclosure request is made by the defense.
The individual prosecutor is presumed to have knowledge of all
information gathered in connection with the government's
investigation. Where the government's suppression of evidence
amounts to a denial of due process, the prosecutor's good faith
or lack of bad faith is irrelevant. 35
Furthermore, the Second Circuit has also been attentive to
the defendant's right to receive exculpatory material promptly.
In Leka v. Portuondo,36 the court reversed a murder conviction
and held that delayed disclosure to the defense of key witnesses,
identified nine days before opening arguments and twenty-three
28 Id. at 453-54 (noting that Kyle's license plate number was not on the list).
29 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
30 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433.
31 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-3.11(a) (3d ed. 1993)
32 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (1984).
33 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437.
34 63 F.3d 1200 (2d Cir. 1995).
35 Id. at 1208.
36 257 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2001).
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days before the defense began its case, constituted "suppression"
of evidence by the Government under Brady.37 It should be
noted, however, that the Second Circuit has set a rational limit
on the defendant's right to receive timely exculpatory material.
In United States v. Coppa,3 the court rejected the notion that
the Government has a constitutional duty to disclose Brady and
Giglio v. United States39 material immediately after the
indictment has been delivered.40 Therefore, a failure to provide
immediate disclosure does not constitute suppression of
evidence.
Coppa was only a mild retreat. In Gil, the Second Circuit
re-emphasized the gravity of the prosecutor's obligation to make
timely disclosure. The court held that disclosure of Brady
material one to two days prior to trial is not sufficient time for
adequate preparation by trial counsel.41 In light of Gil, Leka,
and Coppa, the amount of time sufficient for adequate
preparation is unclear. It is important to recognize, however,
that there is a link between the time for preparation and the
"suppression" and prejudice findings necessary to establish a
Brady violation.
By finding a Brady violation in Gil, the court had to
conclude that the prosecutors "suppressed" Brady material by
withholding it until two days prior to trial and that the
suppression of the exculpatory information was prejudicial to the
defendant. 42 In addressing the prejudice prong of the Brady test,
the court referenced Leka:
When... [an exculpatory] disclosure is first made on the eve of
trial, or when trial is under way, the opportunity to use it may
37 Id. at 98-101.
38 267 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2001).
39 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (noting that favorable evidence includes not only
evidence that tends to exculpate the accused but also evidence that is useful to
impeach the credibility of a government witness).
40 Coppa, 267 F.3d at 146. But see United States v. Shvarts, 90 F. Supp. 2d 219,
224-29 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment
requires the prosecution to disclose all exculpatory and impeachment materials as
soon after an indictment as such materials are requested).
41 See supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text. Cf. Coppa, 267 F.3d at 146. It
should be noted that if the trial judge in Coppa simply issued a scheduling order of
immediate disclosure rather than characterize the obligation as a constitutional
mandate, the circuit would likely have upheld the ruling as being within the judge's
sound discretion. Thus, trial judges have the power to help ensure a defendant's
right to Brady material is not compromised by prosecutorial suppression.
42 United States v. Gil, 297 F.3d 93, 101-05 (2d Cir. 2002).
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be impaired. The defense may be unable to divert resources
from other initiatives and obligations that are or may seem
more pressing. And the defense may be unable to assimilate
the information into its case.43
In other words, the defense's ability to employ the
exculpatory disclosure as part of the trial strategy is pertinent to
the prejudice analysis. 44 It was clear that, in a case involving
disclosure similar to Gil, no such opportunity existed. Thus, the
Second Circuit stated:
Although the Bradford memo was produced before trial, the
defense was not in a position to read it, identify its usefulness,
and use it. It was among five reams of paper labeled "3500
material," delivered sometime on the Friday before Monday
trial, at a time presumably when a conscientious defense
lawyer would be preoccupied working on an opening statement
and witness cross-examinations, and all else.
Moreover, disclosure on the eve of trial "may be insufficient
unless it is fuller and more thorough than may have been
required if the disclosure had been made at an earlier stage."
The two-page memo was not easily identifiable as a document
of significance, located as it was among reams of documents,
and indexed as Dorfinan 3500 material on page twelve of the
exhibit list. Although the government discounts the
significance of the memo, and reasonable minds can differ
about that (the district judge, for one), the government runs a
certain risk when it turns over so late documents sought by the
defense for so long.
The prosecution contended on appeal that it received the
Bradford memo from OTB "only days before" the government
produced it to the defense. But... the government concedes
that an OTB investigator saw the Bradford memo at some point
during the grand jury investigation .... The government is
reasonably expected to have possession of evidence in the hands
of investigators, who are part of the "prosecution team." The
government thus constructively possessed the Bradford memo
long before it was turned over to the defense.
The government has not otherwise undertaken to justify its
failure to find and timely deliver the Bradford memo, and there
43 Id. at 106 (quoting Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89, 101 (2d Cir. 2001)).
4 See id.
20031
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is no obvious explanation for this failure in light of the
defendant's numerous requests for such documents. 45
Recognizing that the government suppressed material,
exculpating evidence, the court reversed the conviction and
remanded for a new trial.46 The holding of the Second Circuit in
Gil reaffirms a defendant's right to exculpatory material and
provides an impetus for prosecutors to avoid such abuses in the
future.
II. REMEDY FOR THE WRONG
With court rulings protecting a criminal defendant from
discovery abuses, one wonders why the prosecutors involved in
Brady violation cases such as Kyles and Gil are not disciplined or
sanctioned. The Jencks Act,47 which governs demands for
production of statements and reports of witnesses, limits the
remedy for failure to disclose to striking the testimony and, if the
interests of justice require, it permits a mistrial to be declared.48
The Jencks Act does not provide for dismissal of charges, nor
does it provide for any monetary or disciplinary sanctions
against the prosecution. It should be amended to allow for such
penalties. This would provide a necessary remedy, especially for
courts that have been characteristically weak in imposing
sanctions against prosecutors. Limited remedies, such as
striking testimony or declaring a mistrial, do not reflect the
stern opposition to discovery misconduct such as that espoused
by the Second Circuit.
Gil reminds us that, until prosecutors are seriously
punished for their failure to disclose Brady and Kyles materials
in a timely manner, discovery abuses will continue. If the courts
are serious about providing meaningful discovery, then they
must provide real remedies with serious consequences for
prosecutors who fail to comply with the requirements of Brady,
Kyles, and Gil.
45 Id. at 106-07 (internal citations omitted). The exculpatory memo in Gil
became known as the "Bradford Memo," named after a deceased employee of OTB.
See Gil, 297 F.3d at 96.
46 See id. at 108.
47 See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (d) (2000).
48 See id.; United States v. DeFranco, 30 F.3d 664, 667 (6th Cir. 1994).
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